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THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT IN ACTION*
THE ANTI-TRUST statutes have two interests: to prevent the growth of
combinations in restraint of trade, and to declare and enforce rules of mo-
nopolistic competition. Public attention was formerly concentrated on the
market problems incidental to the monopolistic size and strength of pro-
ducers-that is, of sellers. The earlier anti-trust statutes were therefore
written, afid in the main administered chiefly as rules which might if en-
forced preserve conditions of potential competition among manufacturers.'
* The YALE LAw JoumAL gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Kenneth P.
Dillon, Franklin J. Ely, Jr., Richard H. Haigh, Richard G. McClung, and Francis G.
Shepard, in collecting some of the business materials upon which this Comment is based.
These men are Yale Law School students enrolled in the Law-Business Course and are
-now attending the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration.
1. The anti-trust laws, and the literature concerned with them, have hitherto dealt
almost entirely with problems of competition between sellers. NAT. lim. Cou r. BOARm,
PUBLIC REGULATION OF ComET-ITIVE PR.cricns (1929) c. 3, 71-88; Handler, Unfair
.Competition (1936) 21 IOWA L. REv. 175, ISO, 203-204, 221, 244-251; McLaughlin, Legal
Control of Competitive Methods (1936) 21 IowA L. Rv. 274, 285; Watkins, An Appraisal
of the Work of the Federal Trade Commission (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 272, 277. Section 2
-of the Clayton Act [38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1934)] vras framed pri-
marily to eliminate regional price discrimination. See IF. R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1914). This form of discrimination was practiced by national manufacturers
-who undersold their smaller competitors operating vithin a comparatively restricted
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But public interest has shifted to the problems of policy suggested by the
progressive monopolization of the process of distribution. Recent structural
changes in methods of distribution require the legislature to decide what
should be done to control prices in a market in which there are a few power-
ful buyers and either few or many sellers.2 The special problem of such
markets is price discrimination, characteristically imposed by the powerful
buyer on the relatively weak seller. Price discrimination, always an effective
instrument of sellers' monopoly, has conspicuously accompanied, and perhaps
contributed to the growth of large distributive units like the chain stores and
the national mail order houses.3 Manufacturers have sold to the chains at
prices below those charged to independent retailers buying direct, and in
many cases, even below those charged to regular wholesalers. 4 These price
differentials may correspond in part to savings in production, selling, and
delivery costs incidental to quantity selling. On the other hand, parts at
least of the differentials are a concession to the bargaining power of the
chains,5 often given secretly," and hardly based on differences in cost. More-
over, disclosed discounts frequently concealed rebates of .the same type,
as when an advertising allowance was given and no advertising actually
done.7 As a result of reductions in purchasing costs thus achieved, together
with lower operating costs made possible by such factors as more efficient
management and the maintenance of subsidiary warehouses and brckerage
offices, the chains were able fairly consistently to undersell both independent
retailers, and, though with less complete success, cooperatives.8 Indepen-
dents, wholesalers and retailers, have consequently found it increasingly diffi-
cult to operate at a profit.0 The Clayton Act was not elastic enough, nor
territory. The losses which such a practice entailed were recouped by maintaining prices
"above fair market value in other sections." Id. at 8-9. This type of discrimination appar-
ently disappeared after 1914. See CLAUc, Eco o Ics oF OVERHEAD COSTS (1923) 424. For
some of the few efforts by the Federal Trade Commission to consider the problem of
large buyers under the anti-trust laws, see BURNS, TnE DECLINE Or COMPETTIO N (1936)
5-7; see note 10 infra.
2. Some economists use the word "monopsony" to contrast the market of a few
buyers with the monopolistic market of a few sellers. See RoDiNsoN, Tna EconoMIcs
or ImPEREcr CoMPETIrToN (1933) 218-231. •
3. See F. T. C., FINAL REPORT ON THE CHrAIN-SToE I-NVESTiGATIN (Sen. Doc.
No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1935) 24; H. R. RE. No. 2287, pt. I, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1936) 3-4.
4. See F. T. C., op. citra spra note 3, 53-59.
5. See F. T. C., loc. cit. supra note 3.
6. For examples, see WTTE, PURCHASING POLICIES AN1D PRACTICS OF CHAIN DRUG
CoMPAxiEs (Vol. III, No. 2, of U. of Chi. Studies in Bus. Adm., 1933) 43-45. And see
Hearings before the Special House Committee Investigating the American Retail Fed-
eration, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 42, 137.
7. See F. T. C., op. cit. .spra note 3, 59-65.
8. See F. T. C., op. cit. supra note 3, 53-57, and note 179 infra.
9. F. T. C., op. cit. supra note 3, 67 et seq.; cf. Legis. (1936) 36 Cot. L. REv. 1285,
1287, n. 14. But in a recent study of thirty drug store failures only two of the thirty
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sufficiently detailed, to reach the discriminatory price practices character-
istic of this competition between the older agencies of distribution and the
chain stores.'
0
The Robinson-Patman Act" is the first attempt by the national legisla-
ture to extend the anti-trust laws into this area of competition between rival
methods of distribution." Originally drafted and supported by the for-
midable lobby of the independent wholesale grocers, the Act was designed
as an amendment to Section 2 of the Clayton Act, to curb the buying
'advantages of the chain stores;13 as passed, however, it was worded in
language sufficiently general to affect many industries which its proponents
did not originally intend to be regulated,' 4 and operates as an inclusive
druggists attributed their failure to "chain-store competition" CAusEs OF FAmnurx
AmoNG DRuG SToRns (U. S. Dep't Commerce, Domestic Commerce Series, No. 59,
1932) 11.
10. Attempts on the part of the F. T. C. to utilize the original Section 2 of the Clay-
ton Act in aid of buyers were bluntly checked in Mennen Co. v. Federal Trade Com-
mission, 288 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923), cert. denoied, 262 U. S. 759 (1923), and Na-
tional Biscuit Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 299 Fed. 733 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924), cert.
denied, 266 U. S. 613 (1924). These cases limited the application of § 2 to discrimina-
tions, the effect of which might have been "to substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly" in the seller's "line of commerce." Although the Supreme Court
rejected this interpretation in Van Camp Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U. S. 245 (1929),
the Commission did not again attempt to employ § 2 to restrain discrimination induced by
buyers until 1933, when it brought a complaint against the Goodyear C~mpany. Matter
of Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., F. T. C., Docket No. 2116 (Sept. 13, 1933). Follow-
ing the issuance of a cease and desist order on March 5, 1936, the respondent filed a
petition for review in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. See C. C. H.
Fed. Trade Reg. Ser. 1542 B. 308 (1936).
11. 49 STAT. 1526, 1528, 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 13, 13a (Supp. 1936), hereafter cited as
"the Act."
12. The state legislatures have entered this area by enacting so-called anti-chain
store taxes. For a review of the earlier forms of such measures, see Legis. (1931) GO U.
or. PA. L. R-v. 289; Comment (1931) 40 YA= L. J. 431. Recent chain store taxes based
on volume of business are discussed in Comment (1935) 45 YAIE L J. 314. For a sum-
mary of state chain store tax legislation basing the tax on number of'stores, see F. T. C.,
op. cit. supra note 3, 108-109; and see id. 73-82. For a collection of state tax laws aimed
at chains, see (1935) 21 IowA L. Rnv. 93.
13. See Hearings of Committee on the Judidary on H. R. 844z, H. R. 4995, and
H. R. 5062, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 10-19, 1935) 217, 27-28.
14. The following colloquy between Senator Vandenberg, inquiring as to the effect
of the bill upon the automobile industry, and Senator Logan, who vas in charge of the
bill on the floor, is revealing:
Sen. Vandenberg. "Is it not a fact that this provision ,as written entirely with the
field of retail merchandising in mind, and that it never was contemplated that it was
intended to reach into industrial production?"
Sen. Logan. "Really that was my idea about it. However, it had to be general. We
could not pick out one particular business."
Sen. Vandenberg. "I understand."
Sen. Logan. "But I had no idea, until the Senator from Michigan mentioned it, that
it had anything to do with the automobile industry. It might have something to do
"49
THE YLE LAW JOURNAL
prohibition against discriminatory pricing in interstate commerce. Section 1
amends and extends Section 2 of the Clayton Act, but presents no funda-
mental change in legislative policy. Subsection (a) of Section 1 makes it
"unlawful for any person . . . either directly or indirectly, to discriminate
in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality
where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in"
interstate commerce. It differs from the original Section 2 in that it is no
longer necessary to demonstrate that the effects of the alleged discrimination
in price "may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce"; but only that the effect may be "to
injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants
or knowingly15 receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers
of either of them." Although the distinction between an injury to an in-
dividual competitor and a substantial lessening of competition in a line of
trade is more or less illusory, since an injury to a competitor is one of the
most familiar means of proving that there has been a lessening of compe-
tition in general, the change in statutory language may make it possible to
prove a violation of the law more easily than under the former Section,
and at an earlier point in the life-history of a trade practice.10 Subsection
(a) makes several defenses available to an alleged violator. Most important
of these is the provision that nothing in the Subsection "shall prevent differ-
entials which make only due allowance for differences in the cbst of man-
ufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities
in which . . . commodities are . . . sold or delivered." 17 Other clauses
permit sellers to select "their own customers in bona fide transactions and
not in restraint of trade" and to change their prices "in response to changing
conditions affecting the market . . . " Subsection (b) places upon the
accused the "burden of rebutting the prima-facie case" made by showing
that there has been discrimination, but it permits "a seller" to rebut that
with the industry of mining . . . But . . . if we attempt to make exemptions
.... we may run into difficulties with the Supreme Court." 80 CoNG. REC. 6429
(1936).
15. Insertion of the word "knowingly" in Section 1(a) was probably inadvertent,
for its effect is to relieve the grantor from liability although he grants a discrimination
which may injure competition with the grantee's customer, provided that the grantee has,
no knowledge that he has received such a discrimination. That this was not intended,
see 80 CoNG. Ran. 9414 (1936).
16. See H. R. REP. No. 2287, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 8. Col. Charles H. March,
Chairman of the F. T. C., believes that the addition of the clause, "or to injure . . .
competition" etc., will have the effect of enlarging "enormously the ability of one who
is unlawfully discriminated against to protect himself." Drug Trade News, September 28,
1936, p. 45, col. 1, 5.
17. But § 1(a) also provides, "That the Federal Trade Commission may
establish quantity limits . . . as to particular commodities . . . where it finds
that available purchasers in greater quantities are so few as to render differentials on
account thereof unjustly discriminatory or promotive of monopoly in any line of com-
merce . "
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case by showing that the discrimination "was made in good faith to meet
an equally low price of a competitor . . . "18 Other subsections deal with
dummy brokerage allowances,'0 advertising allowances, demonstrators, and
other practices commonly used as vehicles for discrimination. The original
Section 2, moreover, prohibited only the granting of unlawful discrimina-
tions; in the new Act, Congress has made it unlawful "to induce or receive"
such discriminations in price, a provision designed to protect sellers against
the bargaining power of the chains.20
The third section of the Act represents a considerable change in anti-
trust law in that it prohibits certain discriminatory transactions regardless
of their effects upon competition generally, or upon competitors of the parties
involved. This Section, under sanction of criminal penalties, unqualifiedly
forbids "any person engaged in commerce . . . to be a party to, or assist
in, any . . . sale . . . which . . . to his knowledge" grants "any discount,
rebate," etc., not "available" to "competitors of the purchaser" in contem-
poraneous sales "of goods of like grade, quality, and quantity." 2' 1
This Comment will undertake to measure the impact of the Act on a
group of business practices important in the present marketing organization
of the main consumers' goods industries. Although the. factual material for
the study was drawn primarily from the experience of the drug industry,
with a view to making a detailed and continuous survey 'possible, it is
believed that the problems of interpretation and adaptation encountered there
are typical of those which confront such industries generally in attempting
to conform to the Act.
The Wholesaler<s Discount. Discounts based on a purchaser's trade status
are commonly given in the business of marketing consumers' goods.2-2 The
18. Subsection (b) is not considered herein. See Zorn and Feldman, Federal Trade
Connissiom Hearings and the Robison-Patnan Act (1936) 70 U. S. . Rv. 620, 625-
627; Legis. (1936) 50 HAv. L. REv. 106, 116-117.
19. Section 1(c). THE ROBIrsoN-PATmAur Acr (Washington Post 1936) 35-3S;
THORP AND GEORGE, CHECK LisT or PossiBLE EFFECTS OF THE ROnIImSO-PAT='T Acr
(Dun and Bradstreet, 1936) 16; Fly, The Sugar Institute Decions and Ithe Anti-Trust
Laws: 2 (1936) 46 YALE L J. 228, 239-242; Legis. (1936) 36 CoL. L RLv. 1285, 1312-
1314.
20. Subsection (f) : "That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce,
in the course of such commerce, knowingly to ifiduce or receive a discrimination in price
which is prohibited by this section.'
21. Section 3 also contains the following prohibitions: "it shall be unlawful for any
person engaged in commerce . . . to sell . . . goods in any part of the United
States at prices lower than those e.-acted by said person elsewhere in the United States
for the purpose of destroying competition, or eliminating a competitor in such part of
the United States; or, to sell, or contract to sell, goods at unreasonably low prices for
the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor."
22. See BuRNs, THE DEcLINE OF CoumavrrioN (1936) 277-2S0; Alexander, The
Wholesale Differential (1936) 9 J. oF Bus. oF U. or Cnr. 314; Legis. (1936) 36 Cot..
L. Rm. 1285, 1298.
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wholesaler's discount is perhaps the most important example of this class.2 3
In the Robinson-Patman Act Congress failed to declare the legality of this
practice explicitly,24 and its failure makes the ultimate determination of the
issue a matter of statutory construction for the courts. The legality of the
wholesaler's discount as a discrimination under the Act will depend largely
on whether or not the Federal Trade Commission and the courts will con-
sider chain stores as competitors of independent wholesalers. For Section
1(a) of the Act prohibits dnly those price discriminations whose "effect
: . .may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly
in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination, or with customers of either of them." Nor is a discount
illegal under Section 3 of the Act unless it constitutes a discrimination
against the purchaser's "competitors."
As a matter of economic fact chain store systems clearly compete with
the independent wholesaler as well as with the independent retailer; the
chains supplant the wholesaler by supplanting his customers and performing
for their individtial stores services previously performed by the wholesaler
for the independent., It may be expedient, however, to consider. the question
less realistically; for if the Federal Trade Commission and the courts con-
clude that chain stores compete with wholesalers, it may be possible under
the Robinson-Patman Act to outlaw a trade usage of long standing, not
specifically forbidden by the Act, and hitherto regarded as permissible."0
Thus in administering the Act the courts may find it convenient to classify
chain stores and wholesalers as non-competitive because they do not sell
directly to the same customers.20 The use of this definition would probably
23. For an example of the wholesaler's discount, see Matter of Bird & Son, Inc.,
F. T. C. Docket No. 2937 (September 30, 1936), reprinted in Drug Trade News, Octo-
ber 12, 1936, p. 39, cols. 1-5; Commission Hears Bird Case, Printer's Ink, December 10,
1936, 57, 60. The wholesaler may receive his discount in the form of a higher quan-
tity discount rate than that accorded to independents or to the smaller chains buying direct
from the manufacturer. See Matter of Richard Hudnut, F. T. C. Docket No. 2973 (No-
vember 6, 1936), reprinted in Drug Trade News, November 23, 1936, p. 58, cols. 3-5;
LEARnx, PRoBLEzis IN MARKETING (1936) 186.
24. The bill as originally reported to the House contained the following provisions:
"That nothing herein contained shall prevent or require differentials as between purchasers
depending solely upon whether they purchase for resale to wholesalers, to retailers, or to
consumers, or for use in further manufacture; for the purpose of such classification .of
customers . . ., the character of the selling of the purchaser and not the buying shall
determine the classification . . ." See H. IL R P. No. 2287, op. cit. supra note 3, pt. If,
at 1-2. This clause was later deleted without explanation at the request of the Commit-
tee on the Judiciary. See 80 CoNG. REc. 8139, 8223.
25. See Mennen Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 288 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923),
cert. denied, 262 U. S. 759 (1923).
26. Competition is "the effort of two or more parties, acting independently, to secure
the custom of a third party by the offer of the most favorable terms . . ." Web-
ster's New International Dictionary (1928) at 455.
[Vol.,46: 447
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lead to the further conclusion that wholesalers are not to be regarded as
competitors of cooperative buying associations and chain buying syndicates.er
For the M11enizen case indicates that such retailers' associations will be classi-
fied in the category to which their constituent members belong. - The circuit
court of appeals there said2 9 that the nature of a purchaser's selling rather
than its buying determines its trade status, and that under the original
Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act, a manufacturer had
a "right" to classify retailers' group buying organizations as retailers.50
But even if chain store systems are regarded as competing Wvith whole-
salers, the wholesalers' discount cannot be considered illegal under the Act
unless it can be shown to restrain or injure that competition as a price
discrimi ration. In some instances, no price discrimination could be shown.
For the wholesaler's discount may be offset by other discounts given ex-
clusively or in greater amount to chains, as where the chain obtains a
larger quantity discount by purchasing in larger quantities, the net result
being that the chain receives the same or an even lower price than the
27. Retailer cooperatives exdst to some extent in the drug trade. At the Close of
1929, 7,550 drug retailers, or 13.1%1 of the total number, were members of cooperative
buying associations. See F. T. C., COOPERATIVE DRUG AND HArDWARE CrAms (1932)
(Sen. Doc. No. 82, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.) 3. But they have not enjoyed the success of
those in the grocery trade. Id. at 12; cf. MERRELL, GR-rrTm, Aim KITTEL, RESERicriou
OF RETAIn PRIcs CuTrNG wITr EmpHrAsis ON THE DUa INDUSTRY (N. R. A. Work
Materials No. 57, 1936) 43, and Ball & Larrabee, Drug Voluntarics, Printer's Ink (De-
cember 3, 1936) 53 (both suggesting reasons for this failure).- Manufacturers dislile to
grant trade discounts to cooperatives for fear of boycotts by regular wholesalers. Cf.
F. T. C., .upra, at 14; see LEARNED, PRoDLEus IN MAmrETnG (1936) 190.
For a discussion of chain buying syndicates, see F. T. C., SPscrAL Discourrs AND
ALLowANcEs To C3xArN AND INDEENDENT Dsnuurots-Tocco TRADE (Sen. Doe.
No. 86, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1934) 13, 14. For chain drug company officials' attitude
toward cooperative buying, see WInr, op. cit. supra note 6, at 39. "The cooperative
usually confines its activities to those lines in which the individual chain's volume is not
large enough to allow it to get quantity discounts itself." Id. at 37.
28. Mennen Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 233 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923), cert.
deied, 262 U. S. 759 (1923).
29. Id. at 782.
30. A special problem of classification is raised by those retail chains who engage in
-wholesaling operations. In the drug trade in 1930, 14.35 of all drug chains reporting
(21.9% if measured by sales) engaged in such operations, and in 1928, the ratio of their
-wholesale sales to total sales was 10.5% (2.3% of all drug chain sales). F. T. C.,
WHoLESALE Busmrnss OF RETAIL CeANs (Sen. Doc. No. 29, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.,
1932) 6, 9. These chains sell at wholesale primarily to dispose of surplus stock. Id.
:t 29.
They might argue that in selling at wholesale they are in competition with wholsalers
and therefore entitled to the wholesaler's discount. The problem is complicated by the
fact that at the time of purchasing commodities, the chains cannot determine what por-
tion thereof, if any, will be sold at wholesale. It is possible that manufacturers would
be required to give such chains "rebates on that part of the business later shown to have
b~een done at wholesale." See Taoa, A'z GEoRGE, op. cit. szpra note 19, at 20.
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wholesaler.31 If the chain and wholesaler receive the same price, the chain
would have no cause to complain under the Act even though the cost of
selling to it was lower than that of selling to the wholesaler, for the Act
apparently does not compel the granting of a price differential because of
differences in cost.
32
It has been suggested that even if wholesalers are not regarded as com-
petitors of chains and other retailing groups, wholesalers' discounts are
illegal if they are so large that the wholesaler will pass enough of the
benefit on to his. retailing customers, to permit them to undersell retailers
buying direct from the manufacturer, since the Act prohibits price discrim-
inations whose "effect . . . may be . . . to injure . . . competition
with . . . customers of either" the manufacturer or the wholesaler.33 In
the drug industry at least, however, it is highly improbable, if not impos-
sible, that the wholesaler's discount is ever sufficiently large to permit this
result, since the wholesaler's costs of distribution plus the profits he takes
more than neutralize his trade discount.
The attitude of the Federal Trade Commission toward the wholesaler's
discount is not clear from the complaints which it has brought thus far
under Section 1 of the Act. Although at least three refer to wholesalers, 34
and in two of these the Commission cites examples of the wholesaler's dis-
count, only one can possibly be construed as questioning its legality.3 5 Even
in this instance, it is by no means clear that the Commission intended to
plead that the wholesaler's discount was unlawful.30
31. Some manufacturers consistently sell at the same price to retailers and whole-
salers. LEARNED, PROBLE-MS IN MARKETING (1936) 199; Distribution Policy'of a Hosiery
M~lanufacturer (1925) 3 HAV. Bus. REV. 240. Other manufacturers sell at lower prices
to chains than to wholesalers, LEARNED, Op. cit. supra, at 440, 445.
32. At one stage in the legislative history of the bill a phrase was inserted which
would have clearly permitted a seller to refuse such a differential. See H. R. REP. No.
2287, op. cit. supra note 3, pt. I, at 2. Its deletion later was termed, a "minor change,"
and was explained on the ground that the phrase was "unnecessary." See H. R. REP. No.
2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 6.
33. See Montague, Merchandising Under the Robison-Patinan Act, Advertising
& Selling, October 8, 1936, 29, 76; Daughters, Lawful Discrinination under the Robhi-
son-Patman Act, Dun & Bradstreet Monthly Review, October, 1936, 7, 8, 40.
34. Matter of Richard Hudnut, Matter of Bird & Son, Inc., both supra note 23,
Matter of United States Quarry Tile Co., F. T. C., Docket No. 2951 (October. 17, 1936),
reprinted in Drug Trade News, October 26, 1936, p. 32, cols 4-5. See TIIE RomNSgo-
PATIAN AcT (Washington Post, 1936) 11.
35. Matter of Richard Hudnut, stpra note 23.
36. Little information is yet available as to the drug trade's reaction to the Act
insofar as trade status discounts are concerned. It is reported that "in none of the trades"
in which the wholesaler's discount exists, have the producers used the Act "as an excuse
to withdraw the discounts allowed prior to its passage." Alexander, The Wholesale Dif-
ferential (1936) 9 J. oF Bus. or U. oF CnI, 314, 338. This is contradicted, however, by one
drug chain in a communication to the YALE LAW'JOUENAl., dated November 2, 1936.
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The strongest practical justification for the wholesaler's discount, as a
matter of policy, is the manufacturer's interest in keeping the independent
wholesaler in business, partly because of the wholesaler's ability to distribute
to independent retailers in rural areas where chain stores are less numerous
than in citiesa and partly to prevent the chain-store purchasers from dom-
inating distribution completely.3s But the contention that the wholesaler
performs a useful economic function hardly justifies a usage which give
him a price advantage over alternative agents of distribution. To the extent
that he actually provides needed services not made available by the chain,
his survival would seem assured without a price subsidy. Meanwhile, elim-
ination of the wholesaler's discount will tend to remove those wholesalers
who have been accustomed to demand larger trade aiscounts rather than
to increase the efficiency of their management. 0
Quantity Discounts. Discounts which purport to reward the purchaser
of large quantities of a commodity with a price lower than that charged to
other purchasers are the most familiar of all vehicles for price discrimina-
tion. ° The drug industry has developed the quantity discount in a variety
of forms, of which three or four may be isolated as typical and important."
One frequently used in the drug industry is the "straight quantity discount."
It appears as a specific percentage deduction from the unit price when a
stipulated number of units are purchased in one sale.42 The schedule of
discounts commonly provides for progressively larger deductions as quan-
tities purchased increase. Of the several forms of quantity discounts, this
is the one most nearly capable of being administered to reflect the savings
in costs believed to result in many industrial situations from purchases in
large quantities. But this form of the quantity discount is frequently given,
37. See Ostlund, The Distribution at Wholesale of Various Proprictary, Drug, and
Sundry Items (1936) (Bull. No. 20, Statistical Div., Nat. Wholesale Druggists' Assoc.)
6; Address of H. J. Ostlund reprinted in Drug Trade News, September 23, p. 14, col 4.
But cf. NV=, op. cit. mpra note 6, at 23-24.
33. That the independent is the only bulwark that the manufacturer has against dom-
ination by the chains, see WrrrE, op. cit. Supra note 6, 71-74. And see Bums, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 280.
39. Cf. Copeland, The Present Statis of Wholesale Trade (1923) 6 HA~v. Bus.
RLv. 257, 262-263; Ball and Larrabee, Whither Wholesaling?, Printer's Ink, December
17, 1936, 6, 108. For an unsuccessful attempt to entrench the wholesalers' discount under
the N. I. R. A., see Section I of Article VIII of the N. R. A. Code of Fair Competition,
Wholesaling or Distributing Trade; LuArmso, PonLnxus in Mnn um (1936) 445-457.
40. Cf. Learned, Quantity Buying from the Seller's Point of View (1929) 8 Herjv.
Bus. Rnv. 57, 63-65.
41. See V. T. C., SPE.AL Discouv-rs A D ALLOWANCES To CrAIN AND INMDEENDENT
Dsnmu'roRs-ToBAcco TADE, supra note 27, 16-26.
42. The classification herein adopted is not identical with that employed by the
F. T. C. in its chain store reports. The Commission had no category for non-progres-
sive, non-cumulative quantity discounts. Id. at 21-23.
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like other discounts, merely to promote sales.43 Another familiar form of
quantity discount is the cumulative "volume allowance with a quota speci-
fied.""4 It consists of a percentage discount based on the total purchases
made during a stated period and is given only if the purchases total a- speci-
fied minimum. 45 As the amount of the total purchases increases above the
minimum for the period specified, the size of the discount is ordinarily
increased in proportion.4 0 Discounts of this type are cited in a recent com-
plaint in which the Federal Trade Commission charges Richard Hudnut
and its subsidiaries with allowing independent retailers and chains having
less than twenty stores a 5% discount payable at the end of a year if
purchases during that year exceed $2,500 and with allowing customers
operating more than twenty stores a similar discount if purchases during
the year exceed $5,000.47 The chief purpose of such- discounts is probably
to "encourage buyers to concentiate their purchases with one company,"
thereby inducing regular patronage, an objective which is apparently seldom
accomplished.48 Professor Learned has stated that cumulative discounts do
not substantially reduce distribution costs due to a concentration of orders,
nor result in a reduction of small purchases, and that many demands for
rebates are "made to secure an advantage over a competitor." 40
Variants of the cumulative quantity discount in the drug trade utilize in
several ways the plan of giving a customer a special discount if his purchases
43. For an exceptionally clear example of the use of the straight quantity discount
for this purpose, see LEAomz, P!iOBLEvS IN MARKETING (1936) 440. A further example
is afforded by the practice of a cheese manufacturer who allows "a five percent discount
on all specific purchases . amounting to five dollars or more in which one deliv-
ery is required!' Matter of Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., F. T. C., Docket No. 2935 (Sep-
tember 30, 1936), reprinted in Drug Trade News, October 12, 1936, p. 38, cols. 3-5, p.
39, col. 1. The respondent has apparently conceded that the discount is given for pur-
poses of sales promotion. See its Answer to the complaint, digested in (1936) 4 U. S.
L. WVEEK 297; cf.-Drug Trade News, October 12, 1936, p. 34, col. 2.
44. See F. T. C., op. cit. supra note 41, at 21; Stevens, Some Laws of Quantity Dis-
counts (1929) 2 J. OF Bus. oF U. or Cur. 407, (1930) 3 J. OF Bus. or U. oF Cr. 51.
45. The allowance may be given in the form of a lower unit price, rather than in the
form of a percentage discount. See Matter of Standard Brands, Inc., F. T. C., Docket
No. 2986 (November, 1936). This type of volume allowance may be given in addition to
a regular quantity discount. See Matter of Richard Hudnut, supra note 23.
46. See, e.g., Matter of Standard Brands, Inc., supra note 45.
47. Matter of Richard Hudnut, supra note 23. And see Matter of Shefford Cheese
Company, F. T. C., Docket No. 2936 (September 30, 1936), reprinted in Drug Trade
News, October 12, 1936, p. 38, cols. 1-3. For examples of the cumulative type, see COPE-
LAND, PRoBMts IN MARcErTING (4th ed., 1931) 722. See also the description in Federal
Trade Commission v. National Biscuit Company, 7 Fed. Trade Com. Dec. 206 (1924).
48. See Learned, Quantity Buying from the Seller's Point of View (1929) 8 HAIv.
Bus. Rsv. 57, 65; cf. Copeland, Some Present-Day Problems of Distribution (1931) 9
HARv. Bus. REv. 299, 306.
49. Learned, snpra note 48, at 67.
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during one period increase above the total made during some prior period.5°
Finally, there is "the volume allowance with no quota specified," which has
little resemblance to the quantity discount, as it is commonly employed.5 It
accounts for a large proportion of all discounts in the drug trade and may
best be defined as a concession to the bargaining power of the purchaserr-2
justified not because a particular sale or series of sales -involve a large
quantity, but because it is worth a price to the seller to get the purchaser
as a customer, either from valuable advertising he will receive from the
fact that a prominent retailer carries his product,m or because he has reason
to expect, although each sale may not involve a particularly large quantity,
that total purchases by the customer will accumulate in volume otherwise
sufficient to permit a discount. 4 Thus in a recent complaint the Commission
charged that Bird & Sons, Inc. sells floor coverings to Aontgomery-Ward
and Company at prices lower than those offered to competing purchasers
and regardless of the quantity purchased by Mfontgomery-WNard. 5
Section l(a) of the Act prohibits quantity discounts unless they can be
shown to- "make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manu-
facture, sale, or delivery, resulting from the differing methods or quantities
in which . . . commodities are . . . sold or delivered!' The Act thus
permits quantity discounts if the person defending the discount can prove
that the sale or delivery to the favored customer cost less than the sale or
delivery of the same commodity or service to other purchasers, and that the
discoufht did not exceed in amount those differences in costs. °
There are several ways in which quantity sales might be considered to
lower manufacturing costs. If overhead expenses are viewed as costs allocable
to the production of each unit of output, each sale may be regarded as
decreasing the amount of overhead "costs" which each unit sold should
contribute to gross earnings. Since a large order effects a greater economy
of this type than a small one, discounts proportional to the size of the order,
giving to the purchaser a part of this economy, might be considered as justified
by a saving incident to the size of the sale.F7 Second, to the extent that a
particular manufacturer plans his production depending upon the orders
50. See F. T. C., op. cit. supra note 41, 23-25. An example is afforded by the price
policy of a soap manufacturer who pays a cash allowance equal to "5 percent of the
aggregate amount billed during the year, if the purchases exceeded by 10 percent the
average annual purchases of the four preceding years. This allowance is computed and
adjusted semi-annually.' Id. at 23-24.
51. Id. at 16-21. This type is particularly common in the grocery trade. Id. at 2L
52. Cf. id. at 16. 53. Cf. kV=m, op. cit. vtpra note 6, at 47.
54. Communication from a small manufacturer to the YAxx IAW JoU IAL, August,
1936.
55. Matter of Bird & Son, Inc., supra note 23.
56. Section 3 of the Act merely requires that in contemporaneous sales of goods of
like grade, quality, and quantiy, all discounts shall be available to all competitors.
57. Learned, supra note 48, at 59-60.
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received in advance, a large order will permit him to space his manufac-
turing operations more evenly, thereby saving him the increase in labor
charge per unit which results from overtime wages."s
Both the size of a sale and the methods used in handling it may affect
a manufacturer's selling costs. Differences in the seller's procedure often
accompany differences in the size of the sale and result in more or less
tangible economies. Thus, customers who purchase in large quantities often
place their orders without solicitation from salesmen, thereby effecting sav-
ings in selling costs in the form of salesmen's salaries. 9 Or when methods
of sales are similar but quantities are varied, a larger order may be con-
sidered as reducing selling costs per unit in the form of salesmen's traveling
expenses, since such expenditures are fixed, regardless of the size of each
order.10 Clerical and bookkeeping expenses in handling orders are other
items included in calculating sales costs which are relatively small per unit
on large orders.61
Moreover, costs of delivery may be different for sales which differ in
quantity or method of handling or both. Thus, the unit cost of tackaging,
labeling, and transporting the commodity varies with the quantities involved
in a particular sale.62 And these differences in costs may be either offset
or widened by other differences in methods of delivery, as where delivery
is made to the individual stores- of a chain rather than to a chain's central
warehouse. 63
This catalogue of possible variations in business procedure which might
be regarded as sources of "differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or
delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such
commodities are . . . sold or delivered" sufficient to justify a discount
indicates how confused and inconclusive the quest for cost differentials under
the Act may become. A preliminary classification of those cost elements
which may not be considered allocable to particular sales under this Section
is suggested by the Congressional debates on the Act. The statements of
Congressmen in charge of the bill, though often contradictory, indicate that
they regarded the manufacturing process as involving some "facilities or
activities inseparable from the business as a whole," and others which were
58. Id. at 60-61.
59. LEARNED, PROBIMzIS IN MARKETING (1936) 440, 445.
66f. See Learned, supra note 48, at 61. 61. Id. at 62.
62. Ibid. McKesson & Robbins, Inc. (wholesale druggists) state: "From accounting
experience we know that considerable shipping economies are effected where single
monthly shipments instead of a great number of small shipments can be made:' Drug
Trade News, November 9, 1936, p. 3, col. 2, p. 63, col. 3.
63. See Fly, supra note 19, at 242-244. Furthermore, even when delivery is made
to a central warehouse, the savings may be more than offset by the extra cost of hand-
ling. Thus, one purchaser receiving shipments at his warehouse in large quantities asks
"that individual items be labeled for individual stores to which they are to go and that
individual bills-be made for each store." Learned, supra note 48, at 62.
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"attributable to the business of particular customers.'0 1 They considered
price differentials unlawful if "based on allocated or imputed, as distinguished
from actual, differences in cost, representing particular facilities . . . which
the favored customer may not have immediately utilized but with which the
seller cannot dispense in the general conduct of his business."es Precisely
what the Congressmen had in mind whan they distinguished "allocated"
from "actual" costs is not clear, since almost all costs must be "allocated"
in the accounting sense, especially for any firm which uses its facilities to
produce more than one commodity or service. The most plausible reading
of the passage, in its context, indicates that the distinction corresponds roughly
to that taken by some cost accountants between direct and indirect costs.,,
"Direct costs . . . are costs visibly traceable to a given job or order or
class of business without the need of difficult studies or allocations, but
merely by watching the process."0( 7 Indirect costs are those "not so directly
traceable," such as "the work of the central office, the power plant, watch-
men and sweepers, and the sales force." °s This distinction hinges upon the
ease with which costs may be directly traced to each particular sale. Perhaps
all that can be said is that any discount can be justified if it is easy cnough
to impute cost differences to the sale in which the discount is granted. The
courts may find the process of imputation easier than the Congressmen did.
The trial court in the Suegar Institute case, considering the legality of the
Institute's attempted ban on quantity discounts, found that savings in
indirect costs could be allocated to particular sales. c6 The fact that there
seems to be no practical reason here for a sharp distinction betveea direct
and indirect costs, coupled with the fact that the words of the statute on
their face do not suggest the distinction, may foreshadow a judicial con-
struction of the Section ignoring the distinction betveen "direct" and "in-
direct" costs which it seemed the purpose of Congress to make.
However far afield the courts will permit sellers to go in finding cost
differences to justify discounts, the Act requires that differentials in price
"make only due allowance" for such cost differences. This limitation of
proportionality makes it difficult if not impossible to defend trade status dis-
counts as generalized quantity discounts base4 on savings in costs; and
64. See H. R. REP. No. 2287, op. cit. supra note 3, pt. I, at 10.
65. See SEr. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 5-6. But see statements
to the contrary made by Mr. Utterback. SO CoiTG. Rc. 9417 (1936).
66. The trial court in United States v. Sugar Institute, 15 F. Supp. 817, E63 (S. D.
N. Y. 1934), aff'd, 297 U. S. 553 (1936), found that quantity sales effected no appre-
ciable savings to the refiners in direct costs. See Fly, stpra note 19, at 242
67. See CLA=K, Ecozolucs oF OvEmHEAD Cosvs (1923) at 56.
68. Ibid.
69. United States v. Sugar Institute, 15 F. Supp. 817, 869 (S. D. N. Y. 1934), aff'd,
297 U. S. 553 (1936). The court found that sales which distributed production more
evenly through the year effected savings to the refiners. See Fly, mtpra note 19, at 242.
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raises serious doubts as to the legality of quantity discounts, which are more
directly connected with the statutory criteria of "quantity or method" of
sale, since it seems impossible to measure these differences in cost with
any precision. Systems of cost accounting with respect to production costs
have been developed in a few industries, "but even these are usually in
terms of general averages . . . and almost never kept on a basis of pur-
chasers' orders. In but few cases, are they developed in terms of the costs
involved for various quantities which may go through the manufacturing
process."7 0 And apparently no adequate system of cost accounting dealing
with the allocation of selling costs where a manufacturer employs different
selling methods has yet been developed.7 1 Therefore the prediction that "due
allowance" may be construed to mean "reasonably more or less"1 2 will be
of little comfort to the seller who wants to continue to grant quantity dis-
counts.
The Act is already perceptibly changing quantity discount usage in the
drug trade. Members of the trade report that they have at least temporarily
abolished all discounts which never purported to be based on costs, such
as "volume allowances with no quotas specified."1 3 Furthermore, while one
toilet goods manufacturer writes that "we have not altered our quantity
discount terms, believing that the discounts granted are fully justified by
savings in selling and/or delivery costs," 74 many manufacturers have ap-
parently encountered considerable difficulty in establishing discount schedules
which have a demonstrable relation to the savings in cost resulting from
quantity purchases. This difficulty no doubt accounts for the action of some
manufacturers who have abolished all discounts regardless of the relative
cost of selling and distributing any order.73 Some who have taken such
70. See Address of Dr.. Willard L. Thorpe to Trade Association Executives, re-
printed in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS ON THE RODINSON-PATUAN ANTI-DlscRnZhxATuoN
AcT (1936) 55, 58.
71. Ibid.
72. THE RoBINSON-PATrAT ACT (Washington Post, 1936) 29; and cf. findings of
fact in Matter of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., supra note 10: ". . . the problem is a
practical one . . . [ind) a discount is not to be condemned merely because it does
not mathematically accord with cost differences.'
73. Communication from a large drug chain to the YALE LAW jOURIAL, November 2,
1936. On the other hand, it is reported that many manufacturers are simply marking time,
and continuing existing price practices until the F. T. C. indicates its attitude toward
the specific prohibitions of the Act. Communication to the YALE "Aw JOURNAL, Decem-
ber 26, 1936.
74. Communication to the YALE LAW, JOURNAL, November 9, 1936. The Vick Chem-
ical Company states: "The . . . Robinson-Patman Bill caused no change in Vies
sales policy . . . Our chief concern is to protect the best interests of all druggists.
We have done this by not giving extra discounts or rebates, special quantity discounts
or advertising allowances in any form to any customer." Drug Trade News, November
9, 1936, p. 3, col. 5.
75. Thus one pharmaceutical specialties and cosmetics distributor informed the trade
that "effective October 26, 1936, . . . the same prices and terms will apply to all
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action, however, are using the Act as an excuse for abolishing certain con-
cessions to buyers which, though not outlawed by the Act, had long been
obnoxious to them as price reductions. 0 Others, in a mood of initial panic,
regard the Act as requiring a revolutionary change in all prior business
practice, a conviction which may disappear as the Act takes on the concrete-
ness of administration and adjudication.
Another change in quantity discount practice has occurred because the
.Act makes it difficult to avoid discriminating by way of a discount against
those buyers, the quantities of whose purchases fall just below the amount
necessary to justify the next higher discount. One seller has attempted to
avoid this difficulty by subdividing the classes into which a purchase might
fall, thus increasing the number of classes and decreasing the price differ-
entials between each class. 7. Certain manufacturers are dealing with the
problem in the opposite way, by revising and raising their minimum discount
limit and dropping "from their lists of distributors" short-line jobbers "who
have been in the habit of buying less than minimum quantities"2 8 These
manufacturers feel that although this action will have the result of con-
fining their sales "only to those customers who are best able to earn
maximum discounts," it is the most practicable solution to the problem of
justifying quantity discounts under the Act. °0 This action appears to sub-
stantiate the contention made by a large wholesaler that some "manufac-
turers favored the smaller houses by giving them smaller quantities at the
best discount." 80 The fact that an upward revision of discount schedules
is resulting may also explain the statement of one chain that all wholesalers
are being "forced to buy in quantities stipulated by the manufacturer."' 8
The treatment of quantity discounts under the Act raises squarely one
of the ultimate objections to its policy: its excessively cost-minded theory
customers . . . alike, regardless of the quantities purchased." Communication to
the YALE LAW JOURNAL, November 6, 1936. See Druggists' Research Bureau, What
are Economical Quantity Purchases?, DRUGGISTS' CIRCULR, September, 1936, 77: "It is
not always easy for a manufacturer to establish quantity discounts which are in keeping
with the savings effected and which, at the same time, are equitable and fair to all his
customers. Some manufacturers, recognizing this great difficulty, have eliminated all
quantity discounts!'
76. For e.-amples of this use of the Act, see Sales Management, September 15, 1936;
Drug Topics, October 19, p. 3, cols. 4-5.
77. See Drug Trade News, November 9, 1935, p. 3, col. 2.
78. See Drug Trade News, October 26, 1936, p. 1, col. 5, p. 33, cols. 2-3.
79. Id. at p. 1, col. 5. But that this action may have been due to "the establishment
of consignment selling policies by manufacturers," see id. at p. 33, col 2.
80. Communication to the YALE LAw JOURZAL, November 5, 1936.
81. Communication to the Y.. LAw JouNAL, November 2, 1936. One small drug
manufacturer-distributor picturesquely. writes that the Act "hurt the chain" because they
formerly purchased "from hundreds of dealers," from whom they bought small quantities,
and "chiseled and pumped" for everything they could get out of them "and were in most
cases always successful . . .," and that these tactics have ceased.
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of prices and price control.sla Any evaluation of the effect of the Act on
quantity discounts, even accepting its premises as to the relation of costs
and prices, must recognize that it will not neatly circumscribe all quantity
discounts based on cost differentials and, leaving them untouched, eradicate
the rest. The difficulty of adducing proof that a particular quantity discount
is justified cost-wise will doubtless result in the elimination of many volume
allowances which may have coincided, perhaps fortuitously, with cost differ-
entials. The Act will furthermore make it difficult to justify either quantity
discounts of the cumulative type and others which do not purport to reflect
cost savings but are used as sales promotional devices or those which are
used as vehicles of price competition in industries where listed prices are
inflexible. For the Act allows discdunts which recognize savings in cost
resulting directly from large sales, but makes no provision for discounts
which may themselves effect a savings in cost by stimulating sales, thereby
increasing production, and making possible, it may be, a realization of
economies incident to the larger scale.82
Defenders of the Act concede the force of these objections of economic
policy; in their view they are overbalanced by the possible utility of the
Act in eradicating "the volume allowance with no quota specified," which
had been used to cloak discrimination in favor of the larger chains and
mail-order houses. As in other areas of trade practice regulation within
the scope of the Act, judgment as to its desirability depends on how seri-
ously one regards the menace of the chain stores, and how important one
considers price discrimination as a factor in their success. 83
Freight Allowances. When goods are sold at a delivered price, buyers
whose mode of taking delivery involves unusually low costs are commonly
granted allowances which purport to give them the benefits of f.o.b. pur-
chasing, in that the price charged them is corrected, by way of freight
allowances, for the difference between the cost of delivery to them and
the usual cost of delivery contemplated by the list price. While such freight
allowances may be easier to justify than quantity discounts under the cost
proviso of Section 1(a), they may be moie vulnerable than most other dis-
counts to attack under the first clause of Section 3. Consider, for example,
a typical problem in freight allowances suggested by a usage in the drug
industry. Some chains have their purchases shipped directly to their in-
dividual stores, while others receive their purchases at central warehouses
from which they distribute the merchandise to their individual stores.. Where
81a. Cf. p. 482 infra.
82. The trial court in the Sugar Instiltte case recognized this possibility. United
States v. Sugar Institute, 15 F. Supp. 817, 869 (S. D. N. Y. 1934) ; see Fly, Supra note
19, at 242.
83. As to the importance of price discrimination as a factor in chain store success,
see infra note i80, supra note 3. On the chain stores hs monopolies, see p. 479 infra.
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these differences exist,' a manufacturer who regularly prepays all freight
charges regardless of the number of deliveries may give an allowance to
those chains operating central warehouses "to cover the cost of distribution,"
or in the form of a "straight distribution allowance in lieu of deliveries at
various stores."3s Under Section 1(a), the legality of such allowances would
appear to depend upon whether they can be justified as based upon savings
in the "cost . . . of delivery." It should be possible in the usual case to
demonstrate that delivery and billing costs of shipping carload quantities to
a few central points are lower than costs of delivering small quantities to
many stores.85 But Section 3 prohibits any discount or allowance unless it
is "available" to all "competitors" purchasing contemporaneously in like
quantities. The question is whether a manufacturer can make freight allow-
ances "available" to all his competing customers in accordance with this
provision merely by offering the allowances to any purchaser who takes
delivery at a central warehouse. The element of doubt in the situation is
the fact that as a practical matter many purchasers would be unable to take
advantage of the offer because of their inability to maintain central ware-
houses. A similar problem is presented whenever the manufacturer condi-
tions the granting of a discount on some fixed requirement. It is hardly
possible that he will be forbidden to impose any such conditions. On the
other hand, it is equally unlikely under Section 3 that he could impose a
purely arbitrary condition as a subterfuge to exclude all purchasers except
the favored competitors. The freight allowance based on delivery to the
purchaser's central warehouse does not on its face seem entirely a device
to conceal discrimination, since delivery to the central warehouse of one
chain results in some savings in cost to the manufacturer who delivers to
the scattered stores of competing chain buyers. Yet the mere fact that those
able to take advantage of the freight allowance are ordinarily those who
have the greatest bargaining power might lead a court to hold that the offer
of a discount was not "available' to all "competitors.' In any event, the
uncertainties of interpretation may cause many manufacturers to sell to
all customers directly on an f.o.b. basis.
Terms of Sale. The practice of granting differing terms of sale to differ-
ent purchasers presents a more puzzling problem of statutory interpreta-
tion.86 Such differences may at times be dearly discriminatory. Thus, the
84. See F. T. C., supra note 41, at 43.
85. But see note 63 supra. Cf. F. T. C., op. cit. supra note 32, at 43. Of course, the
manufacturer could not use the cost savings resulting from delivery to a customer's cen-
tral warehouse to justify both a quantity discount and a freight allowance unless the
saving equaled the sum of the combined discounts.
86. For a brief, general description of the practice see Comw.tam, Pno nr.is nr Mn-
XIMNG (2d ed., 1923) 723. And see ComrmsE, ELmmlrrs or MtAlnrr (1931) S95-
896.
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National Association of Wholsale Druggists reports that in the drug trade
a 1% discount (2% in the South) is offered for cash payment on all whole-
salers' sales as a customary trade practice, but that larger discounts are
occasionally granted for cash payment which are "essentially price adjust-
ments."87 It is not clear, however, that the Act applies to such discrimina-
tions. As originally introduced, the bill's prohibitions applied to discrinina-
tions either in price or in "terms of sale."8 8 This phrase was ultimately
deleted, however,, because the Conference Committee believed that "the bill
should be inapplicable to terms of sale except as they amount in effect to
indirect discriminations in price within the remainder of Subsection 1(a)." 80
In each case, then, the problem is to decide whether differences in terms of
sale -impinge on price so directly as to be considered differences in price. It
seems reasonably clear that differences in the size of cash discounts would
be treated as price differentials. But it is doubtful whether a manufacturer
who sells to two customers at the same price, giving credit to one and
demanding cash from the other, or offering them different credit terms, is
to be regarded as discriminating in price. Such differentiation among cus-
tomers seems permissible under the clause reserving to sellers discretion
in "selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint
of trade."
Where differences in terms of sale are considered as price differentials,
they are nevertheless legal if they can be justified as being based on savings
"in the cost of . . . sale . . . resulting from" a different method of sale.
This provision would not permit random variations in the amount of cash
discounts accorded to different customers. Nor could a manufacturer selling
on credit charge higher prices to those purchasers whom he deemed bad
credit risks because at the time of making such sales he could not justify
the discrimination as one based upon "differences in . . . cost." But a
manufacturer would probably be justified in charging a somewhat lower
price in a cash sale than in a sale on credit, since a cash payment would
certainly reduce his costs by giving him the use of the moiiey for the loan
period. Of course, the cash discount could make no more than "due" allow-
ance for this saving in interest. It might be contended that cash payment
does not reduce "the cost of-manufacture, sale, or delivery" within.the mean-
ing of the Act, and that any cost reduction thus achieved does not result
from "differing methods" of sale or delivery; but so narrow a construction
87. See OSTLUND, ANALYsis OF THE OPERATIOX OF SERVICE WHOLESALE DRUGGISTS
:n 1935 (1936) (Bull. No. 21, Statistical Div., Nat. Wholesale Druggists' Asso.) 4. A
discriminatory policy in regard to cash discounts is described in Federal Trade Com-
mission Y. Mennen Co., 4 Fed. Trade Com. Dec. 258 (1922). For a 'use of the cash
discount as a device for price adjustment, see COPELAND, PROBLEMS IN MARKE-TINO (4th
ed. 1931) 704; ToSDAL, PROBLEMS IN SALES MAAGEMENT (rev. ed. 1926) 382.
88. See H. R. REP. No. 2287, op.,cit. supra note 3, pt. I, at 18.
89. See H. R. REP. No. 2951, op. cit. supra note 32, at 5.
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of the Act seems unnecessary, and, if adopted, would result in the elimina-
tion of a business practice which in most instances is clearly within the
category of discounts otherwise permitted by the Act.
Advertising Allowances. The advertising allowance is another device
which manufacturers frequently employ as a vehicle for special concessions
to favored customers.Y0 Typically it takes the form of a payment, either in
cash, credit, or merchandise, which purports to be made for newspaper adver-
tising, handbill distribution, window display, or for what is vaguely termed
"featuring" or "pushing."'91 In the drug trade, such allowances are quite
common, being given more frequently to chains than to wholesalers who do
relatively less advertising.02 The motives for granting these allowances are
mixed. They are obviously given to some extent for their ostehsible purpose,
namely, to obtain advertising.of the manufacturer's product.03 The manu-
facturer may favor the large chain over the small one or the direct buying
independent either because the large chain can get lower advertising rates,
or because its advertising is more effective In that its numerous stores make
the advertised product more accessible to the public.04 On the other hand,
advertising allowances are often merely concessions to bargaining power.05
This is probably least generally true in the case of allowances for newspaper
advertising, since that form of advertising is easily checked by manufac-
turers to insure that the allowances are expended for the purpose specifiedY0
The Federal Trade Commission reports that newspaper advertising allow-
ances "are given oni the basis of actual cost" more often than other forms.PT
But in the case of window and counter displays, advertising allowances are
commonly a form of price cutting; for, although they are frequently based on
a specified number of windows or counters for a specified period, many man-
ufacturers make little or no attempt to ascertain whether they have been
accorded the services for which they granted the allowances.08 One authority
views all forms of advertising allowances as a medium of price competition
more palatable than price cutting to a manufacturer who "prefers not to
admit violations of his faith . . . in a one-price religion.!'0
90. See F. T. C., op. cit. supra note 41, 26-31.
91. Id. at 31-43. Frequently the allowance is in the form of "free" goods, which is
given for "featuring" or "pushing" the manufacturer's product. Id., 34-39. "The term
'featuring" . . . means nothing more, essentially, than that special or particular promi-
nence is to be given to some article " Id. at 34. Free deals are considered iifra,
page 472.
92. For the distribution of allowances among wholesalers, chains, and department
stores, see F. T. C., SPEcIAL DIscouzNs AND A.LLoWANcES T O CH=n ArD I.IEPENMENT
DjsTRmuTons, supra note 41, at 9.
93. See Lyox, ADvERTIsING ALLOWA%,CES (1932) 16-22.
94. Cf. quotations from 'manufacturers in F. T. C., op. cit. siepra note 41, at 27.
95. Id. at 31-43. 96. Id. at 31. 97. Id. at 32. 93. Id. at 32-35.
99. Lyo-x. op. cit. supra note 93, at 24.
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Section l(d) of the Act was specially designed to clarify the legality of
advertising allowances. 100 It forbids "any person . . . to pay . . . any-
thing of value to or for the benefit of a customer . . . as compensation . . .
for any services or facilities furnished by or through such customer in con-
nection with the sale of any products . . . sold . . . by such person unless
such payment . . . is available on proportionally equal terms to all other
customers competing in the distribution of such products."10°t
One question raisled by this Section is whether advertising allowances
given to chains must be made available on proportionally equal terms to
wholesalers, in view of the difference in the character of their business. As
has been previously stated, it can be argued that the requirements of Sec-
tions 3 and 1(a) do not apply as between wholesalers and chains on the
ground that they are not "competitors" nor "in competition" within tile
respective meanings of those Sections. But Section l(d) applies to persons
"competing in the distribution" of commodities. This phrase seems to
describe quite accurately the chain-wholesaler relationship, and it therefore
appears probable that advertising allowances must be made available to
them on a proportionately equal basis. 02
A second and more fundamental problem is raised by the fact that the
Section is silent as to the element to which the allowance or payment is
to be proportionally equal. One possibility is that the phrase is to be read
as meaning "proportionally equal to the value of the advertising services
rendered the manufacturer by the customer.'103 Under this standard, a
manufacturer who gave customer A an allowanc6 for a counter display would
have to make counter display allowances available to all his customers com-
peting with A in the distribution of goods, but could vary the amount of
the allowance according to the value of the particular counter display. But
it would be extremely impractical to attempt to regulate allowances accord-
100. Section 3 of the Act simply requires, as in the case of quantity discounts, that in
contemporaneous sales "of goods of like grade, quality, and quantity," all advertising
allowances shall be "available" to all "competitors"
101. Thus far, the F. T. C. has issued one complaint in which the respondent is charged
with granting advertising allowances in violation of Section 1(d). Matter of Bouriols,
Inc., F. T. C., Docket No. 2972 (November 9, 1936), reprinted in Drug Trade News,
November 13, 1936, p. 57, cols. 4-5, p. 58, col. 1. The inducement or acceptance of ad-
vertising allowances would not appear unlawful unless the word "price" in Section 1(f)
can be interpreted to include this type of discrimination. See note 20, supra; and cl. THE
ROBINSON-PATmAN Acr (Washington Post, 1936) 45.
102. But see Legis. (1936) 36 COL. L. REV. 1285, 1315.
103. See THoRP AND GEORGE, op. cit. supra note 19, at 13. According to the House
committee in charge of the bill, "the phrase 'proportionately equal terms' is designed
to prevent the limitation of such allowances to single customers on the ground that they
alone can furnish the services . . . in the quantities specified, Where a competitor
can furnish them in less quantity, but of the same relative value, he seems entitled, and
this clause is designed to accord him, the right to a similar allowance commensurate with
those facilities!' See H. R. REP., No. 2287, op. cit. supra note 3, pt. I, at 16.
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ing to this test in view of the inevitable variation in the value of the same
service when rendered by different customers and the difficulty of arriving
at any accurate estimate of that value.1°'0 For example, in the case of an
allowance for counter display such variables would have to be measured
as the size of the display and its location in the store, the location of the
store itself, and the good-will of the proprietor.
The Section might be interpreted, however, as meaning that allowances
and payments are to be proportionately equal to the volume of the customer's
purchases from the manufacturer.105 This test at least has the advantage
that it is susceptible of practical administration. But its adoption would
distort the function of the advertising allowance, since the manufacturer
would not necessarily secure returns equivalent to his expenditures.
In the case of newspaper advertising, the manufacturer could satisfy the
requirements of the Section regardless of which interpretation is adopted
by offering to contribute some uniform percentage of the cost of any such
advertising any customer wished to do. This was occasionally the practice
before the Act,10 but it has the obvious disadvantage of permitting customers
to force the manufacturer to do more advertising than he vishes, particularly
since the advertising may be of greater value to the customers' stores than
to the manufacturer's product. 0 7
The plan apparently being most generally adopted by manufacturers who
wish to continue advertising allowances under the Act' 05 utilizes the volume-
of-purchases standard. This is conspicuously true in the case of newspaper
advertising. Thus, many state that their allowances for newspaper adver-
tising are now "on a 50-50 basis," the grantor sharing an equal portion
of the advertising cost with the recipient, and the amount of the allowance
being limited to a maximum of from two to five percent (depending on the
particular manufacturer) of the price paid by the customer for each order.1°0
104. See THoR .AND GEORGE, op. cit. supra note 19, 13-16; Tim Ronnsozi-P, "=.sr
Acr (Washington Post, 1936) 42.
105. See THoRP AND GEORGE, op. cit. stpra note 19, at 13.
106. See Lyox, op. cit. supra note 93, at 63-64.
107. Cf. THoRI AND GEoRGE, op. cit. supra note 19, at 13. But cf. Statement of Hugo
Mock to the Toilet Goods Association, reprinted in Drug Trade News, September 28,
1936,.p. 98, col. 1.
108. Following the passage of the Act, the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. "dis-
continued all newspaper advertising in the Eastern districe." Furthermore it "issued a
ruling that no advertising allowances were to. be accepted until the current confusion
surrounding administration of the new law was cleared up." See N. Y. Times, July 18,
1936, p. 13, col. 4. But in August, this grocery chain "decided to accept advertising al-
lowances from food manufacturers again and is offering contracts . . . essentially
the same as those in effect previous to the enactment of the . . . law, except that
they contain a clause to the effect that 'the manufacturer avows its willingness to make
the same agreement as is here made with any other purchasers similarly situated and
on proportionally equal terms." See N. Y. Times, August 27, 1936, p. 37, col. 1.
109. See Andrews, Patiman Policies, Printer's Ink, November 5, 1935, 29, 37, 40-4L
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One possible objection to all plans of this type is that on small orders the
size of the allowance would be so insubstantial as to preclude the possibility
that it could be actually expended even for cooperative newspaper adver-
tising.110 This being the case, if the retailer accepts the allowance, it would
becoine an unlawful price discrimination under Section 1(a); and if he is
forced to refuse it, he might claim a violation of Section l(d).
In the case of allowances for window and counter display advertising,
many manufacturers are said to have abolished them altogether,"' but of
those who have not, some are likewise employing the volume-of-purchases
standard. Thus, a prominent manufacturer of toilet goods writes that all
of its "payments for store advertising [are] on a per box basis."112 How-
ever, this method is apparently not altogether satisfactory to some of the
chains. They propose to sell advertising space to the manufacturers under
an agreement entirely separate fr6m the sales contract. 13 Under the plan,
according to its proponents, "there will be no relation between the amount
of goods bought by the chains and the price paid by manufacturers."' 114
Instead, that price is to be determined upon a basis proportionate to the
annual "volume of business done by each store subject to the contract."'110
These chains conclude that by divorcing the question of window and counter
display advertising of the seller's products from the sales transaction itself,
manufacturers will avoid the prohibition of the Section on the ground that
the payment for advertisihg would no longer be "in connection with . . .
the sale . . . " It seems doubtful, however, if this argument will be suc-
cessful, although it could conceivably be urged that such advertising allow-
ances would be granted on a basis "proportionally equal" to the value of
the service for which the payments are given."10
The obvious weakness of Section 1 (d) in failing to prescribe any element
to which allowances are to be .made proportionally equal is perhaps under-
standable in.view of the difficulty of finding any entirely satisfactory standard
for such comparisons. The only way out of the dilemma, short of abolishing
advertising allowances altogether, would be to require a complete divorce
of advertising allowances from the sales contract, a step which has beeh
urged by experts."17 To the extent that the isolation of the agreement would
drive the allowance into the open where it could be measured against the
110. See Statement of Hugo Mock, supra note 107, at col. 1.
111. "There is little or no demand for windows or counters." Communication from
a drug wholesaler to the YALE LAW JOURNAL, November 5, 1936.
112. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL, November 9, 1936.
113. See Drug Trade News, September 28, 1936, p. 62, cols. 1-5, p. 63, col. 3, p. 101,
cols. 3-4. And see proceedings of the meetings of the Affiliated Drug Stores, a buying
syndicate composed of 31 drug chains operating more than 450 units, reported in Drug
Trade News, supra, at p. 65, col. 1-2.
114. Id. at 62, col. 1. 115. Id. at 65, col. 1. 116. Cf. id. at 101, col. 4.
117. LyoN, op. cit. mipra note 93, at 94-95.
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value of the service for which it was supposedly given, elimination of allow-
ances granted solely because of bargaining power would tend to result. But
this plan would never eliminate the element of discrimination entirely, for
even if the manufacturer gave allowances only for actual value received,
he would not be compelled to give such allowances to the smaller chains
and independent retailers.
Aside from its failure to overcome the difficulty inherent in attempting
to compel an equitable apportionment of advertising allowances, Section 1(d)
has a further weakness. It does not require that independents buying from
wholesalers be given allowances on proportionally equal terms with chains,
since if such independents receive allowances at all, they secure them from
wholesalers, and not, as do the chains, from manufacturers?' 8 Meanwhile,
since manufacturers are commonly adopting the volume-of-services standard
in order to comply with the Subsection, the real function of advertising
allowances, namely, to compensate the purchaser in accordance with the
advertising services he renders, is being distorted. The fact that the Sub-
section may effect a wider distribution of advertising allowances does not
weaken this objection.
"P.lls" or Push Money. Some manufacturers grant "P.Tid.s" or cash
allowances as a means of encouraging wholesalers' salesmen and retailers'
clerks to apply special selling effort to the grantor's products." 0 These pay-
ments are sometimes made indirectly by giving the purchaser a discount based
on the volume of his purchases which he is expected to pass on to his
salesmen.' e In other instances, the payment takes the form of a bonus
over and above the salesman's salary, varying in amount according to his
total sales, which is often paid directly by the manufacturer or wholesaler
to the purchaser's salesmen.' 12
Although these payments are not directly outlawed by the Act, those at
least i ich are paid to the customer must be inade available on proportionally
equal terms to all customers competing with him in the distribution of com-
modities under Section I(d). But there is some doubt as to whether that
118. Cf. id. at 31-32.
119. See F. T. C., op. dt. supra note 41, at 43-44; W=, op. cit. supra note 6, at
52-53.
120. Thus, one toothbrush manufacturer "gave a Detroit drug chain . . . a small
credit 'to pay 4 cents per brush to clerks for special selling effort." A cigar manuifac-
turer allowed a "jobber, 1 percent in credit as a commission to his salesmen. A tooth-
paste company giving a lump-sum allowance for several purposes includes among them
'extra compensation or prizes to salespeople." F. T. C., op. cit. mipra note 41, at 44.
121. Examples of this method of granting "P.M's." are cited in two complaints issued
by the F. T. C. under the Act: In the Matter of Bourois, Inc., supra note 101; In the
Matter of Richard Hudnut, stpra note 23. These complaints also allege that the prac-
tice, as indulged in by the respondents, violates Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act.
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Subsection is applicable where the payments are made directly to the clerks.
While the Statute covers not only payments made "to . . . a customer,"
but also those made for his "benefit," it seems open to question whether
"P.M.s" are paid for the benefit of the customer. Recent complaints issued
by the Federal Trade Commission attack the practice, 22 and if it is held
that Section l(d) is applicable to "P.M.s", the problem is again raised as
to the meaning of "proportionally equal terms." It seems probable that
manufacturers granting such allowances indirectly through customers would
employ the volume-of-purchases standard, while those giving "P.M.s" direct
would presumably be required to grant to each clerk of each customer
"competing in the distribution" of the manufacturer's product the same
percentage of his total sales. It is not unlikely that in view of these require-
ments, manufacturers will cease to grant such payments rather than attempt
to make them available to all customers in accordance with the Act. It is
unfortunate, however, that the Act did not specifically abolish them alto-
gether. While there is a sharp conflict among the distributors of push
money as to the desirability of the practice,123 disinterested persons probably
would condemn it as a form of commercial bribery apt to result in the
deception of the consumer by the sales clerks who receive the payments.
Demonstrators. It has been the practice of certain manufacturers to pro-
vide favored customers with demonstrators while refusing such a service
to others. The customers in whose stores demonstrators are to be placed
are usually selected according to the volume of their purchases 1 24 Thus,
according to a recent Federal Trade Commission complaint, RPichard Hudnut
apparently furnishes a demonstrator only to those customers whose annual
purchases total $5,000.125 The practice has been particularly common in
the toilet goods and cosmetic trades. Its discriminatory character is enhanced
by the fact that some manufacturers in those trades pay the salaries of
demonstrators in department stores over long periods of time, thus making
the demonstrators "no more than subsidized clerks";120 and it is charged
122. See note 121, supra.
123. See the report of a recent trade practice conference of the toilet goods industry
held under the auspices of the Federal Trade Commission, Drug Trade News, November
23, 1936, p. 1, col. 1, p. 38, cols. 1-5.
124. Cf. Statement of Hugo Mock,.supra note 107.
125. Matter of Richard Hudnut, mtpra note 23. Other complaints alleging violation
of Section 1(e) are: Matter of Bourjois, Inc., stpra note 101; Matter of Coty, F. T. C.,
Docket No. 2975 (November 6, 1936) ; Matter of Elmo, Inc., F. T. C., Docket No. 2974
(November 6, 1936), reprinted in Drug Trade News, November 23, 1936, p. 58, cols. 1-3.
These complaints also charge that the practice of the respondents with respect to dem-
onstrators violates § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
126. See Telegram from Frederick H. Young Company to trade practice conference
of the toilet goods industry, reprinted in Drug Trade News, November 23, 1936, p. 38, col.
4-5.
(Vol. 46: ,447470
19371 THE ROBINSON-PA TMAN ACT IN ACTION 471
that they do not confine their efforts to recommending the product of the
manufacturer who pays them, but also act as salesmen for all products at
their counters.127 Another common complaint is that such salesmen, by
recommending exclusively the products of the manufacturers who pay them,
create the false impression in the buyer's mind that the store itself-the
demonstrator's apparent employer-recommends the product as the best
of its kind to be had in the store, thus deceiving the public and injuring
the manufacturer's competitors.12S
Section 1(e) is designed to strike at this practice. It makes it "unlawful
for any person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser . . . of a com-
modity . . . by . . . furnishing, or by contributing to the furnishing of,
any services or facilities connected with the . . . sale . . . of such com-
modity so purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on pro-
portionally equal terms.' It should be observed that unless the word "pur-
chaser" can be interpreted so as to include not only buyers purchasing from
the manufacturer but also those who buy the manufacturer's product from
wholesalers, the Subsection can have no application to retailers who do not
purchase directly from the manufacturer. On the other hand, unlike Sec-
tion 1(d) this provision is not limited so as to apply solely to "customers
competing in the distribution' of the manufacture's products. The omission
of this phrase makes it unnecessary to show that the service was granted
to one "purchaser" and refused another operating within the same competi-
tive area in order to prove a violation of the Subsection.
Manufacturers will encounter serious difficulties in furnishing demon-
strators to their customers on "proportionally equal terms." As in the case
of advertising allowances, the only feasible way of apportioning demon-
strators is in proportion to the volume of the customer's purchases. Thus,
the manufacturer who grants a demonstrator for the whole year to a cus-
tomer who purchases $5,000 annually might furnish a demonstrator for one
tenth of a year to a store whose annual purchases total $500. But this
suggestion has been termed impractical by manitfacturers, because the services
of such a demonstrator "would not be in proportion to the services of a
whole time demonstrator.2'' 2 Because of this difficulty, leading members
of the drug trade state that the Act will cause the "virtual abolition" of
manufacturer-paid demonstrators, a result which appears to meet with the
approval of a substantial number of producers.u O No doubt demonstrators
when furnished by the manufacturer can serve a legitimate function in secur-
ing consumer acceptance of valuable new products which the retailer acting
127. Matter of Elmo, Inc., supra note 125; Matter of Bourjois, Inc., mtpra note 101.
128. See Telegram from Frederick H. Young Company, supra note 126.
129. Statement of Hugo Alock, vtpra note 107.
130. See Drug Trade News, November 23, 1936, p. 1, col. 1.
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alone refuses or is unable to secure. 31 Yet the practice has apparently
resulted in considerable discrimination in favor of a few large department
stores and in the deception of the consumer.
Free Deals. The free deal is a common sales promotion device, particularly
in the food and drug trades. As its name implies, a free deal is granted
by including among the goods sold in a particular transaction a certain
amount of merchandise for which no charge is nominally made.1 32 The free
goods may consist either of additional articles of the same kind sold, or of
an assortment of other types of merchandise which the seller manufactures
or distributes, 33 and in the drug trade, are distributed both through the
wholesaler and directly to the retailer.'34 The extent of free deal offers
in the drug trade has increased within the last ten years, until the practice
is now of considerable importance. In March, 1936, for example, 190 sepirate
offers were made 35i And, according to a study made by the National Whole-
sale Druggists' Association, when the free goods are calculated as a per cent
of the total amount of the merchandise involved in the transaction, they
constitute a discount of 12.6%.36
The manufacturer's purpose in offering free deals may be simply. to stimu-
late the sales of his merchandise generally, or to focus the retailer's attention
on the manufacturer's line of goods during a particular period, or to move
excess stock, or to sell new or unpopular products by giving along with
them free goods whose reputation is established. 3 Again, the free deal is
frequently offered to meet competition,'3 8 and often operates as a price cut-
ting device.' 30
In general, it involves relatively little discrimination between customers.
Occasionally, however, manufacturers offer a proportionally larger amount
of free goods in deals in which larger quantities are purchased.140 Again,
one manufacturer states that it gives free goods only to. druggists who will
131. Thus, the Bourjois Sales Corp. states: "The maintenance of demonstrations is a
practice of long standing and one of the few means of developing certain important divi-
sions of the Toilet Goods business particularly the cosmetic . . . lines and-even
more particularly the creation of a general demand for new merchandise." Drug Trade
News, November 23, 1936, p. 56, col. 4.
132. OSTLUND, THE DIsrIUmTIoN oF FREE DEALs ny SERvxcE WHOLESALE DauG-
GisTs (1931) (Bull. No. 17, Statistical Div., Nat. Wholesale Druggifts' Assn.) 2; cf.
F. T. C, op. cit. supra note 41, 36-39.
133. OSTLUNeD, op. cit. supra note 132, at 2.
134. Id. at 3-4, 25.
135. See Drug Trade News, Sepember 28, 1936, p. 50, col. 1.
136. OsLUND, op. cit. saPra note 132, at 26.
137. Id. at 6; cf. BORDEN, PRoBLEms IN ADvERTIsING (2d ed. 1932) 432.
138. Drug Trade News, September 28, 1936, p. 50, col. 2.
139. Cf. OSTLuND, op. cit. mupra note 132, at 1.
140. Communication from drug manufacturer to the YALE LAW jOuRNAL, November
20, 1936.
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display its products on their shelves and in their windows, and who will
recommend them over the counter. Such requirements, it states, result in
the elimination of free deals to chains, who usually feature merchandise of
their own brand or manufacture. 14 '
Where free deals are given to one customer and denied or offered on less
advantageous terms to another, they will be difficult to justify under the
Act. In the first place, such a practice will probably be considered a dis-
crimination in price which must meet the cost test of Section 1(a),142 a
requirement which will be particularly hard to satisfy where the discrimina-
tion favors the independent retailer. And even if the manufacturer is able
to argue that the free goods constitute payment for advertising rather than
a price differential, the payment must be available to all competing customers
"on proportionally equal terms" under Section 1(d). But because of the
comparative unimportance of the free deal as a method of discrimination,
the Act can hardly have any considerable significance with respect to this
practice. 43
Private Brands. There has existed for some time in many industries a
practice whereby manufacturers sell at reduced prices to individual chains,
mail-order houses, and larger wholesalers, products labeled with the dis-
tributor's private brand, but of a grade and quality similar to or identical with
that of the manufacturer's nationally advertised product.'1 "1 Although its
figures are not conclusive, because they include merchandise manufactured
by the chains as well as private brands, the Federal Trade Commission found
that in 1931, 43% of 174 reporting drug chains owned private brands.i
When measured by total sales this figure is raised to 53S, indicating the
141. Ibid. ". . . there seems to be a consistent, though not very important, tea-
dency to favor the wholesaler-retailer system of distribution as compared with the chaia
system . . . in the giving of deals ." Lyoz, TnE Econmoaxcs or From DrEED
(1933) at 96.
142. See Ten RoBiNSoN-PAT , r Acr (Washington Post 1936) 15.
143. The desirability of this practice is questioned by some members of the trade.
See Address of Charles Ehlers, Pres. of the Nat. Asso. of Retail Druggists, Drug Topics,
September 28, 1936, p. 14, col. 5. Deals may often lead "the unwary independent into
trouble, because he has purchased simply'to take advantage of what he thought was a
good proposition, and then found himself overstocked with unsalable merchandise."
Wrmr, op. cit. mipra note 6, at 54. Although certain members of the trade write that
the Act has forced them to eliminate free deals, the pages of the drug trade newspapers
still abound with such offers. See, e.g., This Week''s Deals, Drug Topics, November 16,
1936, 38-40.
144. See F. T. C., CrAn-SToRE PRivATE BRa=s (Sen. Doc. No. 142, 72d Cong.,
2d Sess., 1933) 1-4. For examples of this practice, see the following cases: LE.m,
PaoBUs Im MAP=KTIG (1936) 457; TosDAI,, Paom.rus ni SALEs MArAGEUMe, (3d
ed. 1931) 124, 127; id. (rev. ed. 1926) at 275.
145. See F. T. C., mspra note 144, at 21.
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greater use of brands among the larger chains.140 The rapid growth of the
practice can readily be seen from the fact that the proportion of private
brand sales to total sales among those drug chains selling such merchandise
was practically doubled from 1922 to 1930, private brand merchandise con-
stituting over 17% of total sales in the latter year.147 The reasons which
the chains advance for this growth vary, although those most often given
emphasize the fact that sales of private brand goods afford greater profits.148
Thus, measured by number of stores, 90%o of the drug chains report a
higher mark-up on private than on comparable nationally advertised brands,149
although 51% report that they are able fo sell private brands goods at lower
prices, 50 while 36%o report that prices are similar for the two classes of
merchandise.1'1 Moreover the sale and resale of private brands is less ef-
fectively hedged about by restrictions in the interest of the manufacturer
than the marketing of nationally advertised goods, especially since the
Supreme Court of the United States has upheld as constitutional State Fair
Trade Acts which empower the manufacturer to require the maintenance
of resale prices for trade-marked articles ;152 as a result the sale of private
brands is a source of flexibility in competition.otherwise unavailable.
There are at least two approaches to the legal problem raised by the prac-
tice of differentiating in sales price between nationally advertised and private
brand goods. The first is founded on the assumptions that different brand
names do not as a matter of fact differentiate the product nor do they removse
competition between the sellers of national and private brands. If these
premises are accepted, the validity of the differentiation must be considered
under three portions of the Act.
Section 1(a) would prevent price differentials between nationally adver-
tised and private brands unless they were based on one or more of the dif-
ferences in cost prescribed in the statute.0 3 Such differences might be
146. Id. at 24. 147. Id. at 32.
148. Id. at 2-12. ". . . . a well-known though moderately sized department
store chain says: 'The fact that standard nationally advertised brands have so frequently
become the subjects of predatory price cutting by those merchants who use them as
"leaders,'" an advertising device7 and thereby have destroyed the opportunities for legiti-
mate profit on such items, has 'led many merchants to establish brands of their own.'"
Id. at 9. In the drug trade, as a result of price cutting, "over 509 of the standard-
brand items . . . were sold at less than the average cost of doing business in 118
drug chains as compared with less than 1 percent of the private brands." Id. at 87.
Even though the prices at which private brand goods "are sold are commonly below
those of competing standard-brand products," nevertheless, "the private brand goods
carry a much higher gross profit and.probably net profit ." Id. at 88.
149. Id. at 61. Compare id. at 68.
150. Id. at 66. 151. Id. at 67.
152. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., U. S. Sup. Ct.,
(1936) 4 U. S. L. WEan 356.
153. It is fairly common for manufacturers to own several brand names .and to sell
identical merchandise under these different names in order to conceal price discrimilna-
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considered to result from the different methods of sale involved. The argu-
ment is that in determining the price to be charged for the private brand,
no portion of the cost of advertising national brands need be imputed to it.
This allocation of the entire advertising cost to the nationally advertised
brand seems somewhat artificial. For the sole justification for advertising
is that it stimulates the sales of an individual manufacturer, thus permitting
an increase in his production, with attendant reductions in unit costs; and
presumably the private brand benefits by this reduction as much as does the
national brand. Nevertheless, the view that advertising costs can be allocated
exclusively to the advertised brands finds support in the decision of the
Federal Trade Commission in the Goodyear case.I There the Goodyear
Company had produced tires to be sold both under its own nationally adver-
tised brand name, and by Sears, Roebuck and Company at retail under the
latter's own brand name. In a proceeding under the unamended Section
2 of the Clayton Act, the Trial Examiner found that Sears derived a selling
advantage from Goodyear's national advertising because the public knew
that Sears sold tires made by Goodyear. He also found that Goodyear's
sales to Sears increased sales resistance to Goodyear's brands, thereby re-
quiring Goodyear to increase its own manufacturing expenditures. But
despite these findings, the Commission held that Goodyear need not allo-
cate any part of the cost of advertising tires sold under its own brand name
to the cost of producing tires for Sears.63
The legality of variations in price between private and national brands
may also be affected by Section 3. That Section applies only if the price
differential in favor of a private brand can be considered a "discount,"
"rebate," "allowance," or "advertising service charge" within the meaning
of the Section. If it can be so considered, it must be made "available" to
all competing customers. Since by hypothesis, the private brand is com-
mercially the same commodity as the national brand, the statute requires
that both'brands be offered at the same price.
Finally, if the furnishing of goods under a private label is held to con-,
stitute a service or facility, the "terms" upon which the private brand is
furnished to one customer would have to be accorded "on proportionally
equal terms" to all purchasers in accordance with Section 1(e). In this con-
nection, the phrase "proportionally equal" will probably be construed to
mean proportionally equal to the cost of production and delivery of the
particular order of private brand merchandise. It should be noted that since
tions. In such cases, the price differential does not purport to represent a difference in
the cost of selling. See unpublished cases in the Library of the Harvard Graduate School
of Business Research.
154. Matter of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., snpra note 10; see GEor.cm, T=. FEDmnA
TpRAE Connsrox DEcsior x THE GooDYFAR CASE (Dun and Bradstreet, 1936) S.
155. Matter of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., supra note 10, at 9.
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this Subsection is not limited in application to discriminations affecting "com-
petition" or "competitors," the argument could not be made, as it could
under Sections 1 (a) and 3, that differentials in price based on differences in
brands are unaffected if they occur only as between wholesalers and re-
tailers.
If a more realistic approach to the problem is adopted, however, the
premises on which this reasoning has been based become unacceptable, and
the danger of illegality under the Act is greatly minimized, if not eliminated
altogether. As a matter of economic fact, nationally advertised brands are
different commodities than private brands, isolated from them commercially,
if not physically, by the opinions and preferences of consumers, who are in-
fluenced by advertising, packaging, etc., more and more to regard different
brands of the same commodity as unique.15 Under this view, the Act would
be considered as wholly inapplicable to price differe'ntials based on differences
between nationally advertised and. private brands, since the Act implies
throughout that it covers only discriminations between purchasers of "like"
commodities. And even if nationally advertised and private brands are
deemed at law to be the same commodity, because of their physical identity,
the retailers selling the national brand might not be regarded as competing
with the retailers selling the private brand, since there would -be virtually no
competition between the two commodities, within a certain range of price
variation.157 In this event, Sections 1(a) and 3 would be inapplicable, and
only Section 1(e).would remain to be considered: That Section alone would
probably do little to discourage the private brand practice. For the manu-
facturer could satisfy its requirements by offering the private brand ser-
vice to all his customers. Actually, this offer would not be accepted by many
small wholesalers or chains because of the added expense, and effort neces-
sary to sell a private brand.158
If the Act is interpreted as being inapplicable to price differentials be-
tween private and nationally advertised brands, its immediate consequence
may be an increase in the sales of private brands to the larger chains and
perhaps to wholesalers. For, to the extent that manufacturers will raise the
price at which they will sell nationally advertised brands to chains in an
attempt to eliminate various forms of discounts in compliance with the Act,
the chains may turn more and more to the private brand on which they have
already been able to make substantial profits ard with which they can more
conveniently respond to forces of competition. This tendency might in turn
156. See CAMBERLIN, THE T'..oRy or MONOPOLISTIC COMPEITTION (1933) 56-70;
(Some Arguments in Favor of Trade-Mark Infringement and "Unfair Trading") 204-
208.
157. Id., at 65 et seq.
158. ". . . . many wholesalers have discovered that the development of a satis-
factory private brand is a costly and not always satisfactory process." Ball and Larra-
bee, supra note 39, 105.
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lead to the wastes of a brand war,139 in the course of which manufacturers
would continue to sell private brands for fear that the chains might in-
crease their own manufacturing operations, and might also increase their
advertising efforts in connection with their own national brand to counteract
the competition of private brands.
"'Sales" Avoidance as an Escape Device. There remain to be considered
a few marketing practices substantially unaffected by the Act which the
large distributors may increasingly utilize as devices to escape the Act's
sanctions. Each centers around the fact that the Act can apply only where
there are sales of comnodities, and where a seller has at least two customers
to whom he sells a commodity.
One practice which provides an opportunity to escape some difficulty un-
der the Act is that of selling through del credere agents or factors rather
than to wholesalers: This practice has noticeably" increased in the drug
trade since the passage of the Act,'6 0 although the increase is due more to
the .manufacturer's desire to fix or suggest resale prices and thereby to
eliminate the use of his merchandise as a loss leader, than to a wish to avoid
the requirements of the Act. 10' Nevertheless, as one manufacturer has
stated, the concurrence is a happy coincidence"; for by eliminating the sale
to the wholesaler, and paying his agent on. a commission basis, 12 the pro-
ducer avoids the vexing problem as to the legality of the wholesaler's dis-
count. But it should be noted that many manufacturers employing this
scheme continue to sell outright to a few wholesalers operating in rural ter-
ritories where chains do not maintain stores. 03 And some of these manu-
facturers. sell direct to retailers, providing their purchases are for sub-
stantial amounts of merchandise.0 4 Such sellers must make sure that dis-
counts to these customers, if they are greater than those granted to customers
,buying through factors, are justified under the tests prescribed in Section
1(a). Furthermore, even though a manufacturer sells only through factors,
159. See CoRB A.Ey, GRous' SELUNG B 100,000 RErAILrEs (1936) 181; Prelude to a
Brand War, Advertising and Selling, September 10; 1936, 27; cf. Sales Management,
October 1, 1936, 456, 513. As to the waste which such a war entails, see SracImn, MoD-
mN Ecoxomc SocET (1931) 553-570; ef. Copeland, Some Present-Day Problems in
Distribution (1931) 9 I-IAv. Bus. RPv. 299, 307, 30S.
160. See Drug Topics, September 23, 1936, p. 14, col. 2; Drug T6pics, October 19,
1936, p. 5; cf. Drug Topics, October 26, 1936, p. 7.
161. Communication from a drug manufacturer to the YALE LAW JoumiAL, November
20, 1936.
162. See THE RoBrusozT-PA'nuN Acr (Washington Post, 1936) 14; cf. United
States v. General Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476 (1926).
163. Communication from a drug manufacturer to the YALE LAW JolnraL, November
20, 1936.
164. Ibid. At least $80 worth of merchandise must be purchased under this arrange-
ment.
.477
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
he must of course make certain that his quantity and other discounts are
justifiable under the Act, or revise them. This necessity explains the fact
that some of these manufacturers are reported to be altering their price
schedules to accord with the terms of the Act.
A second possible escape device is a practice which existed in a number
of industries even prior to the Robinson-Patman Act whereby a distributor
himself purchased, or had purchased for his account, raw materials, and
shipped them to a manufacturer who in turn processed them "as a fabricating
agent."'0 ;5 Legally it appears clear that the transaction should be described
as a bailment rather than a purchase and sale. This elimination of a sale
between manufacturer and distributor would seem to make the Act entirely
inapplicable. It is therefore possible that the Act will result in increasing the
popularity among large- distributors of these so-called "conversion con-
tracts.":16 The unwieldiness of these arrangements, however, will militate
against their widespread use. Thus, every principal ingredient of the finished
product must be supplied by the bailor, and both parties must at all times
take care that the product is fabricated from the identical, rather than similar,
goods furnished by the bailor. The disorganization of the manufacturing
process which this device would usually necessitate will probably Take its
cost prohibitive except in the case of one or two mail-order houses.
A third possibility is that where it is practical for large distributors to
purchase the total output of small manufacturers,0 7 both buyer and seller
can escape the prohibitions of the Robinson-Patman Act. For the Act can-
not be applied to a producer who sells to only one customer.108
Finally, the large chains and mail-order houses may resort to increasing
their own manufacturing operations in an effort to escape the requirements
of the Act.100 Prior to the Act, the reasons most frequently advanced by
drug chain officials for manufacturing their own products were that manu-
facturing enabled them to control the quality of their merchandise, that they
secured good-will through exclusive sale of their own brands, that costs were
lower and profits were higher, and-perhaps most important-that they
avoided the "cut-throat" competition occurring in the sale of national
brands.170 21.57 of all reporting drug chains, selling 69% of all merchandise
165. See THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT (Washington Post, 1936) 46.
166. See THOeP AND GEORGE, op. cit. supra note 19, at 20.
167. Prior to the Act, chain buying syndicates were able "to take the output of an
entire factory." WirTT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 37.
168. See GASKILL, WHAT YOU MAY AND MAY NOT Do UNDER THE NEw Pmic Dis-
cRnhXINATIoN LAv (Kiplinger Washington Agency, Inc., 1936) 48.
169. Representative Patman is contemplating introducing a bill into the next Congress
which would prevent a retailer from engaging in manufacturing. See Patman, New Bat-
tle Lines are Forming, Nation's Business, December, 1936, 15, 16.
170. See F. T. C., CHAIN-STORE MANUpACTURING (Sen. Doc. No. 13, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 1933) 42.
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sold by chains, engage in manufacturing,w1 but only three chains produce
more than 25% of the total amount of merchandise which they sell, and the
average chain produces only about 13.5%o of its total sales. -72 Although there
are serious practical limitations on the practice of direct manufacturing by
retail drug chains'7 3 it is certain the drug chains have not reached the limit
in expanding their own manufacturing operations.Y-
Conclusion. One of the purposes motivating the proponents of the Robinson-
Patman Act is a desire to restrict the development of chain stores and other
large-scale agencies of distribution. The theory of their argument is that the
chains and other big units of distribution are becoming so huge as to threaten
society with the extermination of the small business man and other con-
sequences of monopolistic power; and further that an ability to command
price discriminations is an indispensable condition of the growth of chains,
so that the elimination of price discrimination could reasonably be expected
to reduce their capacity to expand. 75 No stage of the argument is persuasive-
ly supported by the facts.
In the first place, there is no evidence to indicate that chain stores and
mail order houses are eliminating sources of effective competition as they
grow. Independent wholesalers and retailers have remained in the field;' 70
new, local chains have been organized in many regions, like the "pine boards"
in the drug trade,17T to compete with the larger chains for available business;
cooperatives and associations of independent retailers, though not conspicu-
ously successful in the drug industry,17 are growing vigorously in the gro-
cery tradesy" and promise to become even more important in the future.
17L Id. at 24. 172. Id. at 11. 173. Id. at 11-13, 59-61.
174. Id. at 34. In August, 1932, eleven drug chains predicted a future increase "in the
proportion of goods manufactured by them to their total sales," one predicted a decrease,
and two predicted no change. "This is at striking variance with the replies of food chains
of which less than half of those reporting expect an increase." Id. at 91. A 33-unit
chain states: "'If the price level on nationally advertised goods goes up, the proportion
of sales in our own line will decrease. In other words, we sell goods under our owM
label only because we are forced to in order to make a profit." Id. at 93.
175. H. R. REP. No. 2287, op. cit. mpra note 3, pt. II, at 3.
176. In 1933, there were 58,407 drug stores in the United States, of which only 3,670
-were operated by the 140 chains. In 1933, there were 1,553 wholesale druggists (9%
fewer than in 1929). LEmArn, Pnoains nI L c rro (1936) 649, 654. The inde-
pendent is said to be holding his own in the grocery trade. See ConoALL., op. cit. pra
note 159, at 27.
177. The "pineboard" is a recent innovation in the drug field. It consists of a single
store or a small local chain, operating with low overhead and a large sales volume main-
tained by a policy of price-cutting even more extreme than in the regular chains. See
1nmazLL, GP=Emra, Aim K'rrrE., op. cit. supra note 27, at 46-47.
178. See note 27 supra.
179. For a discussion of the recent growth of voluntary chains and cooperatives in the
fooi distribution system, see CoRBA='z, op. cit. supra note 159, at 51-53. That these
organizations can compete effectively with the corporate chains, see id. at 1M-13S7;
F. T. C., op. cit. supra note 3, at 56; Legis. (1936) 36 Cor. . Rm,. 125, 12S7, n. 14.
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The structural organization of business is changing; but there is no reason
to suppose that the increasing size of national agencies of distribution re-
quires markets to be monopolized as a matter of theory, or is in fact reducing
the quantum of competition effective in those markets. It seems possible,
on the contrary, that the old-fashioned wholesale distributor had more
monopolistic influence in his local market than the contemporary chain or
mail order house has either locally or nationally.
But even if it is conceded that the chain-store problem is important as an
area of potential monopoly; it does not seem accurate to attribute the growth
of chains and other large distributors to their power to extract discriminatory
prices from sellers. Factors of superior efficiency and of economy in or-
ganization are considered more important than a capacity to demand dis-
criminatory discounts in explaining the success of chain distribution.18 0
As an experiment in anti-chain legislation, the Robinson-Patman Act seems
for this reason to be futile and misdirected,18 ' even if it is assumed that it
could be effectively administered to eliminate price discrimination in the
markets where it will be applied.
8 2
The attempt to minimize price discrimination by means of the Robinson-
Patman Act has been defended on more general grounds, as a regulation of
competition desirable for several reasons of social and economic policy.183
180. The F. T. C. made studies of chain and independent buying and selling prices in
four different cities. "On a weighted basis, using chain-store quantities, the difference
represented by the lower chain buying rices on groceries ranged from about 3 percent
of the total difference in selling prices at Cincinnati to about 20 percent in Washington
." F. T. C., op. cit. supra note 3, at 55. "Similarly in drugs, on a weighted basis,
the difference.in chain and independent buying prices ranged from 5.3 percent of the
total difference in selling prices at Memphis to about 17.4 percent in Detroit." Id. at 56.
For general analyses of the factors of chain store success, uniformly discounting the im-
portance of buying advantages, see Phillips, The Robbnson-Patnan An i-Prico Discrim-
ination Law and the Chain Store (1936) 15 HAv. Bus. REV. 62, 64, 75; Flynn, Chain
Stores: Menace or Promise (1931) 66 NEW REPUnLiC 223, 270, 298, 324, 350, esp. 353;
Palmer, Economic and Social Aspects of Chain Stores (1929) 2 J. or Bus. or U. or
CL 272.
181. Anti-chain store taxes, on the other hand, have been effective in curbing the
power of the chains. See authorities cited supra note 12.
182. Even if the Robinson-Patman Act, unfike the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade
Commission Act, is sympathetically interpreted by the courts, there are many trade prac-
tices available which will permit discrimination to continue despite the Act [see page 477
supra]; and even where the Act is clearly applicable, the Commission's slowness in pro-
cedure will keep it constantly trying to catch up with business usage. Thus the F. T. C.
took two and one-half years to consider the Goodyear Tire case [see note 10 .supra]
for a similar delay with the Matter of Bird and Son [supra note 23] see Comnsission
Hears Bird Case, Printer's Ink, December 10, 1936, 57; and Patnan Test Thunders 01,
Printer's Ink, December 17, 1936, 16.
183. "The purpose of this . . . legislation is to restore . . . equality of
opportunity in business by strengthening anti-trust laws and by protecting trade and
commerce against unfair trade practices and unlawful price discrimination, and also against
restraint and monopoly for the better protection of consumers, workers, and independent
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The doctrine implicit in most forms of the defense seems to follow this se-
quence: because all perfectly competitive markets are characterized by price
uniformity-that is, the same commodity is there sold to all buyers at the
same price-and because competition is generally regarded as a Good Thing,
all price uniformity is a Good Thing, and price discrimination a bad one.
The manifest incorrectness of the argument as a syllogism is rooted in a
failure to distinguish between the effects of price uniformity in more and
less competitive markets. In competitive markets, price discrimination is a
monopolistic element, if it can persist; when imposed by a few large buyers
on a large number of sellers, such price discrimination gives the buyers a
larger profit than they would otherwise get, but its effect on output is
probably negligible, unless it iontributes to the development of monopolistic
selling units. In a monopolistic- market containing few sellers, on the other
hand, discrimination is a response to competitive pressures, and will generally
result in a higher output, and a lower average price, than would prevail if
monopolistic price uniformity were enforced.184 The effect of the Act, at
least in theory, is to deny to sellers this privilege of discriminating between
customers on the basis of the relative elasticity of their demand for the ser-
vice. Proponents of the Act contend that its requirement of price uniformity
might as easily result in uniformly lower as in uniformly higher prices: if a
price cut is economically justifiable to one customer, because his demand for
the commodity is quite elastic, it should be generalized to all customers, espe-
cially if they compete with the favored buyer, on vague grounds of "economic
democracy" and "equal opportunity." But in many situations, where market
demand for the commodity is not very elastic, the prohibition against dis-
criminations will operate to require and protect a higher price level than
would otherwise prevail: if the seller is forced to choose between a uniformly
lower price, with a somewhat higher output, and a uniformly higher price,
accompanied by a somewhat smaller output, it will often pay him to elect the
latter policy.
Although the issue was never dearly presented in these terms, the Robinson-
Patman Act amounts to a decision by Congress in favor of uniform prices
against any alternative edonomic end. In many markets where the uniform
prices to be enforced will be monopolistic prices, the decision amounts to
a preference for one-price monopoly against discriminatory monopoly, an
election to which there are serious objections, both economic and social.18 5
producers, manufacturers, merchants, and other businessmen!' H. R. REP. No. 22S7,
op. cit. .supra note 3, pt I, at 3. See also HEARINGS, supra note 13, at 136, 332.
184. Buaps, op. cit. supra note 1, c. 1; CHrAIMEBn, op. cit. xtpra note 156, c. 3;
MAnSHALL, I-DUSTRY AxD TRAF (3d ed. 1927) 415-418; PIGOU, EcoIoMcs or WnVrv=
(3d ed. 1929) 275-290, 339-340; RoBrNsoz, op. cit. supra note 2, 179-203; Fly, Obsrca-
tions on the Anti-Trast Laws, Economic Theory, and thc Sugar hisiilte Decisions: I
(1936) 45 YALE 1. J .1339, 1347; Fly, The Sugar Institute Decisions and the Anti-Trfut
Laws: 2 (1936) 46 Ys.nr L. J. 228, 247.
185. See materials collected in note l4, s.upra.
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The burden of piice uniformity which is implicit in the Act is increased
by its view of the connection between costs and prices. For Section 1(a)
establishes cost analysis as the proper criterion of discount regulation, thus
apparently accepting the mistaken view that under competitive conditions
price is or should be "determined" by costs, even in the "short period"'180
and at all stages of a trade cycle. Under Section 1(a) different prices can
be charged to different purchasers of the same commodity only if they make
no more than "due" allowance for differences in the cost of selling or delivering
the commodity to those purchasers. To reduce the possibility of validating
discounts through this Section, however, the burden of justifying the price
variation is placed on the accused. It seems almost impossible to use the
arbitrary premises and conflicting techniques of cost accounting1' 1 to prove
that a seller has realized economies in any particular sale. At best the issue
can be framed only in terms of the predictable. Thus, "a judge finds that
a quantity discount might reasonably be expected. in the long run1 88 to effect
economies in the cost of production. But under Section 1 of the Act, the
accused must "affirmatively" sho'w that a particular price differential is based
upon a definite and certain calculation of cost savings effected in the sale
under scrutiny. And because the Act makes no allowance for the predictable,
the issue may often be determined itgainst the party upon whom the burden
of proof falls.
In evaluating the Act as one of the anti-trust laws, it seems proper to sug-
gest two. propositions by way of conclusion: that the Act does not seem
capable as framed of preventing the growth of monopolistic combinations;
and that the rules of competition which it proposes promise in their opera-
tion to depart a colisiderable distance from the general policy of the anti-
trust laws, a departure apparently not contemplated by those who planned
the Act, nor by most of those who have thus far defended it.
186. That prices fluctuate as a function of demand, within limits set by costs, see
BURNS, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 30; MARSHALL, PRINcIPLs OF EcoNoMIcs (8th ed. 1930)
374-379; and, for an application of the analysis to the classic problem of railway rates, see
DArNLms, THE PRrcE OF TRANsPORTATioN SEvicz (1932) 57 ff., esp. 66-73. As was indi-
cated above [page 481] the ecoibmic defense of price discrimination by a monopolist is
based on the contingency that the discrimination will accommodate price to elastic demands
for the commodity, not that it will permit prices to vary for differences in selling costs.
The Act does not, of course, prevent a monopolistic seller from reducing his prices below
total costs; but by requiring him, in theory at least, to reduce his price to all customers
at the same time, it makes such price fluctuations more difficult. The advocacy here of a
limited privilege of price discriminalion in distribution should not be construed as a general
support of regional price discrimination, local price-cutting, and other specialized forms
of the practice. FE=ran, MgSQuERAz OF MONOPOLY (1931) ; Souter, Modern Monopoly
as the Gentleman Crook (1933) 48 PoL Scr. Qu. 240.
187. See Canning, Cost Accounting (1931) 4 E-cyc. Soc. ScIExcEs 475, 477: Cost
accounting "rests upon over-simplified and largely arbitrary fundamental analyses" not
to "be taken too seriously."
188. United States v. Sugar Institute, 15 F. Supp. 817, 869 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
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